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ABSTRACT
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In this thesis, we study a linkage between object allocation problems and two-
sided matching markets. Our main purpose is to analyse the desirable properties
such as efficiency, respect for rank and no-discrimination, and associate them with
well-known stability concept. We show that any rank respecting allocation could
be interpreted a stable allocation of a specific matching market. Under certain
circumstances, the allocation also exhibits no-discrimination. Also, we associate our
two-sided matching market derived from an object allocation problem with aggregate
efficiency concept. Moreover, we provide a process that yields the PS allocation.
iv
ÖZET
RASSAL NESNE TAHSİSİ ÜZERİNE
FURKAN DOĞAN
EKONOMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, OCAK 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. MEHMET BARLO
Anahtar Kelimeler: olasılıksal atama, kararlılık, sıralamaya riayet, ayrımcılık,
tercih fonksiyonu
Bu tezde nesne tahsis problemlerinin iki taraflı eşleşme piyasaları ile arasındaki il-
işkiyi inceliyoruz. Temel amacımız, verimlilik, sıralamaya riayet, ayrımcılık karşıtlığı
gibi arzu edilen özellikleri analiz etmek ve bu özellikleri iyi bilinen kararlılık kavramı
ile ilişkilendirmektir. Sıralamaya riayet eden herhangi bir tahsisin, iki taraflı özel
bir eşleştirme piyasasının kararlı tahsis sonucu olarak yorumlanabileceğini göster-
dik. Belirli koşullar altında, bu tahsisat ayrımcılık karşıtı bir özellik de sergiler.
Ayrıca bir atama piyasasından türettiğimiz iki taraflı eşleştirme piyasasını, toplam
verimlilik kavramı ile de ilişkilendirdik. Dahası, PS tahsisini sağlayan bir süreç de
tanımladık.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fair and efficient distribution of the indivisible objects has attracted attention and
has been studied for decades. A random assignment problem is defined as a one-
sided matching problem. Different solutions to this problem have been proposed
and each of them has some strengths and some weaknesses. Characterization of the
solution concepts has been developed and different properties for the solution have
been added to the literature. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)’s investigation on
lack of efficiency in a random priority mechanism1 has accelerated the debate for
the object allocation problems.
This thesis examines an object allocation problem where each individual has a pref-
erence ordering over objects, but objects do not hold any preference relation. As a
solution, we consider a random allocation matrix where each individual ends up with
a combination of probability shares for objects. Each share indicates a probability
that the individual is assigned the object. We care about the ex-ante efficiency as
well as the notion of respect for rank. According to this concept, if an individual
could be made better off by being assigned to an object with more probability and
there exists another individual who receives positive probability from that object,
then second individual should rank that object at least as high as does the first indi-
vidual.2. We show that, in an object allocation problem where each individual has
strict preference over objects whereas objects do not hold any preference ordering,
each rank respecting allocation is ordinally efficient.
We find that approaching this problem and solution concept from a different angle
widens our vision. For this purpose, we transform an object allocation market into
a two-sided matching market. More specifically, we attribute a specific imaginary
preference orderings to the objects in order to have a two-sided matching market.
With this arrangement, we make our analysis based on a different framework where
it will make us look to the problem from a different angle. The driving force behind
1See Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998)
2See Harless (2018)
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the attribution of a priority ordering to an object is to reflect individuals’ preferences
to the objects. That is basically to say that objects enjoy being preferred. An object
prefers the individual who likes him more over an individual who does not rank this
object as high as the former. As we attributed such a preference ordering to objects,
we jump on another domain where both sides have preference orderings.
Note that, beginning with the simple object allocation problem, we derive a new
market associated with the object allocation problem, where both sides have a pref-
erence ordering over each other. It is noteworthy to underline that, attributed
preference orderings are weak preference orderings. We also assume that each ob-
ject has a choice function which corresponds to this weak preference ordering. We
observe that the set of stable allocations is singleton if we consider the attributed
preferences as choice functions that correspond to these preference orderings. More-
over, we prove that if an allocation is stable, which is a well-known property in
matching literature, then it is rank respecting.
The family of choice functions can be thought of as a set of different choice functions
that distinguish only in terms of way of choosing an individual among those who are
is indifferent between this object. One example of a choice function is the following:
Say the choice function assigns equal weight to the individuals in which the object
is indifferent between the given individuals. This defines the well-known constraint
equal award rule. If we allow the object to only use constrained equal award rule
while choosing between the fractions of the individuals in the same preference level,
we are safe to say that the resulting allocation will exhibits no-discrimination and
be rank respecting.
In the second part of the thesis, given an object allocation problem, we introduce a
dynamic process where objects are specialized to follow some rule, called constrained
equal loss, and individuals are also taking a specific action. In this process, each
individual demands a full fraction of his most favored object. Each object who
receives a demand, calculate its excess demands and reduce the demands it receives
equally. Upon receiving a rejection, each individual transfers his rejected proportion
to the next best object. Note that his demand for the previous objects still valid
and can be increased if the object he likes right before this object increases his
rejection. We conclude that the sequence of the individuals is not important since the
individuals and objects take robotic actions. Therefore, any subset of the individuals
can update their demand on any subset of objects with any sequence. They all result
in the same allocation.
The dynamic process exhibits a good property which will be useful for the process
to converge. There exists a time where an object will issue a loss amount and will
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never change it again. That is to say that this object will completely distribute
itself permanently. Any new demand will be completely rejected. Since a sequence
of an individuals’ move does not matter, we formulated this property in the sequence
where individuals move simultaneously. In this regard, the time where an object is
completely exhausted is the time where it has the maximum average excess demand
among the other objects who are not exhausted. More clearly, in every step, there
is at least one object who has the maximum average excess demand. In a pivot
step, if an object has a maximum excess demand among the ones who never have
the maximum average excess demand, then it permanently distributes itself at that
step. This result guarantees that the process will end. Moreover, as the main result,
we prove that the result of the dynamic process coincides with the Probabilistic
Serial rule (PS rule)3.
Even though Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that PS rule results in a weak
strategyproof allocation matrix, we observe that the dynamic process has an incen-
tive problem. However, this dishonesty does not occur while reporting preferences.
It occurs when the individuals do not follow the rule and misreport their demand
vectors. Sometimes they cannot be sure to have a better allocation vector by mis-
reporting, hence they can gamble. However, there exists some situation where indi-
viduals would have certainly the most desirable allocation vectors if they misreport
the demand vectors.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: In chapter 2, we discuss the related literature
and closest works to our study. In chapter 3, we introduce the model, give examples
and provide main definitions and related results. In Chapter 4, we introduce a
new process and show a crucial equivalence. Chapter 5 proves the propositions and
chapter 6 contains the discussion.
3See Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
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2. RELATED LITERATURE
Starting with the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962), the matching the-
ory has been increasingly studied by many economists. Their framework captures
a two-sided matching market with strict preferences. They constitute a marriage
market and establish an algorithm to find a stable matching. However, Hylland and
Zeckhauser (1979) map out the probabilistic object allocation problem and propose
a solution derived from the competitive equilibrium approach. With an equal in-
come, each individual consumes a probability share of an indivisible object. They
are endowed with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over random allocations of
indivisible objects. The solution is efficient in the sense of both ex-ante and ex-post,
assuming that the individuals report their utility values honestly. Zhou (1990) adds
to the literature by proving the incompatibility of efficiency, fairness, and strate-
gyproofness.
On the other hand, Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) propose a mechanism called
random priority, to achieve a fair and strategyproof allocation in an object alloca-
tion problem. Their design orders the individuals randomly and lets them pick an
object from the available object set. Drawing an ordering of individuals from uni-
form distribution catches the fairness and also mechanism results in a strategyproof
allocation. However, if the individuals are endowed with von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities over random allocations, the mechanism misses efficiency in ex-ante sense
(Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001). With this investigation, along with the matching
theory, object allocation problems took more attention. Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001) introduce a quite intuitive process for an object allocation problem to reach
all the ex-ante efficient (ordinally efficient) allocations. The simultaneous eating al-
gorithm proceeds as individuals simultaneously eat probability shares from objects.
If an object is exhausted entirely, then individuals jump to the next best object
and the time runs from 0 to 1. What they eat is considered as the probability of
assigning this object. Different eating speeds result in different ordinal efficient allo-
cations, assuming that the integration of a speed function is equal to 1. Therefore,
the set of all ordinal efficient allocations can be captured by altering the eating
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speeds of individuals. Moreover, they state that a simultaneous eating algorithm
with uniform eating speed (PS rule) results in a envy-free, ordinal efficient and weak
strategyproof allocation. Bogomolnaia and Heo (2012) show that probabilistic se-
rial rule (PS) is the unique rule that satisfies ordinal efficiency, envy freeness and
bounded invariance.
As a contribution to the Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) results, Kojima (2009)
generalize their process to allow individuals to have more than one object. He says
that if all individuals are allowed to have q objects, then time extension to eating
algorithm would still preserve the desired properties. Besides, (Budish et al. 2013)
produce a generalization for both Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and Hylland and
Zeckhauser (1979) results. They extend the market in many ways such as multi-unit
supply, multi-unit demand, the possibility of unassigned individuals and family of
real-world constraints. They also allow for complicated preferences in a pseudo-
market while generalizing the Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) results.
A different angle for an object allocation problem is presented by Alkan and Gale
(2003)’s schedule matching market. They examine a market with two sides, firms
and workers, and allow workers to distribute their working hours between different
firms. Moreover, firms can hire a worker for some hours bounded by a quota for firms.
Both sides hold a choice function over these schedules. They relax the assumption
of responsive preferences and jump to a broader space where substitutable choice
functions reside. They prove the existence of stable matching by using the Gale -
Shapley algorithm. These schedules can be considered as probability shares and the
solution could be a random matching. In this aspect, Kesten and Ünver (2015) also
generalize two-sided matching markets, rather than an object allocation problem, to
have ordinally efficient solutions. They also use a generalization of the Gale - Shapley
algorithm, where fractional acceptances and rejections are allowed. They propose
two algorithms, one for not to lose important fairness properties (discrimination),
the other for capturing ordinal efficiency.
In a deterministic market, besides all properties studied in the literature, Kojima
and Ünver (2014) characterize a new property to improve efficiency. Favoring higher
ranks guarantees that if a student prefers a school different than its match, then
assigned students to the more preferred school by first student rank this school as
higher as the first student. Dogan and Klaus (2018) also emphasize on rank-based
axioms and analyze the deterministic markets.
On the other hand, we find that recent works about the rank based axioms on
an object allocation problem are closest to our study. Harless (2018) defines a rank
respecting axiom, on the same line with Kojima and Ünver (2014). He calls it respect
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for ranks, which is also similar to the justified envy axiom mentioned in Kesten and
Ünver (2015). Harless (2018) characterize a rule to be employed under an algorithm,
called immediate division. Each individual points out the most favorable object, and
related object immediately distributed between individuals who point at it. This
algorithm with a specific distribution rule characterizes immediate division rule.
While distributing the objects, constrained equal awards rule is issued and hence
no discrimination between individuals is eliminated. Under immediate division rule,
objects start to distribute themselves equally between individuals by giving them
an equally increasing share starting from 0. When one individual is satisfied, the
others continue to get equal shares from the object. When an object is exhausted,
if an individual is not satisfied, he brings his remaining part to the next best object.
The resulting allocation satisfies ordinal efficiency, respect for rank and exhibits
no-discrimination. Also, immediate division rule is the unique rule satisfying these
properties.
As we mentioned above, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) find all the ordinal efficient
allocations. Besides, Harless (2019) introduces efficient rules and defines a recursive
algorithm to find all ordinal efficient allocations. The driving force behind this
algorithm is the use of a family of rules for selecting the set of objects to distribute
and family of rules to distribute them. Leading rules are introduced and contain
constrained equal awards and constraint equal loss rule. He also specifically indicate
a pair of selection and distribution rule, which coincides with the result of PS rule.
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3. OBJECT ALLOCATION PROBLEM AND ASSOCIATED
MATCHING MARKETS
3.1 The Model
In this paper, our primary interest is to solve an object allocation problem. Let
I = {1,2, . . . ,n} and J = {1,2, . . . ,n} be two distinct sets of individuals and Pi be a
strict preference ordering for every i ∈ I over J . An object allocation problem over
(I,J) is described by A= (Pi).
An allocation for A is a matrix Q = (qij)i∈I,j∈J where ∑i qij = ∑j qij = 1 and
every qij is a non-negative real number. qij denotes the individual i’s probability of
receiving j. Qi and Qj denote the ith row and the jth column of the allocation Q
respectively.
Based on an object allocation problem, we will construct a two-sided matching
market. First, we will endow every individual j a weak preference ordering Rj over
I, in which j prefers i to i′ if i ranks j higher than i′ does and j is indifferent between
i and i′ if they both rank j at the same level. We call this behaviour as preference for
being preferred. Second, we assume that each individual holds a "choice function".
Let Un ∈Rn be a unit box and denote each element of Un by x, which will be called
as a choice vector. A choice function is a map C : Un → Un such that C(x) ≤ x
for every x ∈ Un. We denote the jth coordinate of the chosen vector as C(x)j . We
assume that every individual has a quota of 1, which bounds the size of the chosen
vectors.
As introduced in Alkan and Gale (2003), a generalized matching market is described
over (I,J) byM= ((Ci),(Cj)) where Ci, Cj are choice functions describing individ-
uals i and j respectively. Since every individual i∈ I has a strict preference ordering
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and every individual j ∈ J has a weak preference ordering, Ci respond to Pi and Cj
respond to Rj , which will be defined formally.
Suppose Pi is constructed as j Pi j+ 1 for an individual i. Given a choice vector x
with |x|> 1, let j be the individual such that
z =
j∑
j′=1
xj′ ≤ 1 and z+xj+1 > 1
Then, we say that Ci is Pi-responsive if
Ci(x) = (x1, . . . ,xj ,1− z,0, . . . ,0).
In Rj , let us call each indifference class as the rank of Rj and denote the rank of i
in Rj as rji 1. Given a choice vector x with |x| > 1, let rj∗ be the rank in Rj such
that
z =
∑
i′
xi′ ≤ 1 where rji′ < rj∗
z+
∑
i
xi > 1 where rji = rj∗
A choice function Cj is Rj-responsive if
Cj(x)i′ = xi′ ,
∑
iC
j(x)i = 1− z, Cj(x)i′′ = 0
for every i′′ where rji′′ > r
j∗. We call rj∗ the border of Rj .
An allocation for a generalized matching market is a matrix Q= (qij)i∈I,j∈J where∑
i qij =
∑
j qij = 1 and every qij is a non-negative real number. An allocation Q is
stable if there is no pair (i, j) such that
Ci(Qi+ zuj)j = qij + z and Cj(Qj + zui)i = qij + z for some z > 0
where uj and ui are the jth and the ith unit vectors respectively. If this is the case,
we say that i likes j and j likes i.
In this chapter, our main goal is to associate allocations for A, which have desirable
properties, with stable allocations ofM derived from A. To guarantee that a stable
allocation exists forM, substitutability of choice functions is the key assumption.2.
1Note that there is a single individual at each class in Pi since the ordering is strict.
2See Alkan - Gale (2003) for more detail.
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Note that strict responsive choice functions satisfy substitutability and consistency.
However, it is not certain how Cj behave at the border. Since each Cj is responsive
to a weak preference ordering, which exhibits a preference for being preferred, we
can easily conclude that the Gale - Shapley algorithm becomes a greedy algorithm.
That is to say that each acceptance is immediate and permanent. Therefore, even
though Cj may violate substitutability condition at the border, there exists a stable
matching since the algorithm is greedy and no cycle can occur because of the non-
substitutability of choice functions.
As we described above, Rj are derived from Pi and exhibits preference for being
preferred. To be more concise and formal, we say that a matching market M,
where Ci are Pi-responsive and Cj are Rj-responsive, is aligned if Rj exhibits
preference for being preferred, i.e. rji = rij for every i and j.
By the following lemma, we present our first observation on aligned matching mar-
kets, without the proof.
Lemma 3.1. Each aligned matching market has a single stable allocation.
An aligned matching market M = ((Ci),(Cj)) and an object allocation problem
A= (Pi) are associated with each other if every Ci are Pi-responsive.
An object allocation problem has associated with itself a family of aligned matching
markets whereas an aligned matching market has associated with itself a single
object allocation problem.
3.2 Examples
Let A = (Pi) be an object allocation problem. Below we give examples of aligned
matching marketsM = ((Ci),(Cj)) which are associated with A. Let us define Pi
as
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
1 2 2 1 1
2 1 3 3 3
3 3 1 4 4
4 4 4 2 2
5 5 5 5 5
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We will construct two different matching market based on A and compute their
(unique) stable allocations when Cj are one of the following well-known choice func-
tions.
Equal Award Choice Function: Cj(x)i = min{λ,xi} and λ ∈ R+ is chosen so
that ∑i′∈I Cj(x)i′ = min{∑i∈I xi, cˆj}
Equal Loss Choice Function: Cj(x)i = max{xi−λ,0} and λ ∈ R+ is chosen so
that ∑i′∈I Cj(x)i′ = min{∑ixi, cˆj}
where cˆj is the amount of j available. If the matching market is aligned, in the Gale
- Shapley algorithm, cˆj can be thought as the quota minus what the more preferable
individuals receive from j, that is cˆj = 1−∑i′ qi′j where rji′ < rji .
According to preference orderings of individuals, Rj can be constructed as
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
1,4,5 2,3
2 1 3,4,5
3 1,2 4,5
4,5 1,2,3
1,2,3,4,5
Now, let Cj are equal award forM1 and equal loss forM2. The stable allocations
ofM1 andM2 can be found by the generalization of the Gale - Shapley Algorithm
and respectively yield the following allocations;
1/3 0 0 1/9 5/9
0 1/2 0 1/9 7/18
0 1/2 1/3 1/9 1/18
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0


1/3 0 0 11/36 13/36
0 1/2 0 5/36 13/36
0 1/2 2/9 0 5/18
1/3 0 7/18 5/18 0
1/3 0 7/18 5/18 0

We have shown that, given an object allocation problem, different aligned matching
markets, which have different stable solutions, can be constructed. Note that not all
of different matching markets have different stable solutions3. In the next section,
we will show that the stable allocation for M has desirable properties which are
defined for a solution of an object allocation problem.
3Consider a problem with two individuals. Let i and i′ both prefer j to j′. Then, j and j′ are both indifferent
between two individuals. Consider two different associated matching markets, where one assumes Cj are
equal award, the other assumes Cj are equal loss for every j. The stable allocation for both matching
markets are the same, in which i and i′ both assign to j with probability 1/2 and j′ with probability 1/2.
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3.3 Respect-For-Rank and No-Discrimination
Let A = (Pi) and M = ((Ci),(Cj)) be the markets that are associated with each
other. Given an allocation Q, we say that j is bottom of Qi if qij > 0 and qij′ = 0
for every j′ such that j Pi j′.
Definition: An allocation Q is rank respecting if qi′j = 0 for every i, i′ and j such
that j is not bottom of Qi and ri
′
j > r
i
j .
Proposition 3.1. If Q is the stable allocation for M then Q is a rank respecting
allocation for A.
The proposition helps us to find a rank respecting allocation for a one-sided market
A by using generalization of the Gale - Shapley algorithm which is defined in two-
sided markets.
Definition: An allocation Q exhibits discrimination against i if rij = ri
′
j and j is
not bottom of Qi but qij < qi′j .
The following proposition is the analog of Theorem 1 of Harless (2018). The way
we have constructed the market helps us to simplify proofs of the results and makes
use of the well-known Gale - Shapley Algorithm.
Proposition 3.2. An allocation Q for A exhibits no-discrimination if and only if
Q is the stable allocation ofM and Cj are equal award.
The properties above are well-known properties and studied in the literature. The
following definition is a new property of a solution of an object allocation problem.
Definition: An allocation Q exhibits cumulative discrimination against i if
rij = ri
′
j , j is not bottom of Qi and qi′j > 0 but q∗ij < q∗i′j where q∗ij =
∑
j′ qij′+qij for
every j′ such that j′ Pi j.
Consider the matching marketM2 and its stable allocation in the previous section.
Here, cumulative discrimination can only be against individuals 3,4 and 5 for object
3 and individuals 1,2 and 3 for object 4. However, for the individuals 3,4 and 5 we
have;
∑
j=2,3 q3j =
∑
j=1,3 q4j =
∑
j=1,3 q5j
For the individuals 1,2 and 3 we have;
∑
j=1,2,3,4 q3j >
∑
j=1,2,3,4 q1j =
∑
j=1,2,3,4 q2j .
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In this example, we observe that the allocation for the matching marketM2, where
Cj are equal loss, exhibits no cumulative discrimination. We believe that this result
can be generalized for all matching markets, where Cj are equal loss, associated
with an object allocation problem. However, we do not provide proof for this result.
3.4 Ordinal Efficiency and Aggregate Efficiency
Let A= (Pi) be an object allocation problem. Given an allocation Q of A, a cycle
is a sequence of pairs (i, j) such that each consecutive pairs have either the same i
or the same j but not both and each cycle starts and ends with the same pair (i, j).
An improvement cycle is a cycle in which for all i in the cycle, either jn Pi jn+1
and qinjn+1 > 0, or jn+1 Pi jn and qinjn > 0 are true. Therefore, there exists ∈ (0,1]
such that ∆qinjn = + and ∆qinjn+1 = −, or the opposite, for all pairs (in, jn) in
the cycle.
That is to say that an improvement cycle is a sequence of individual pairs in an allo-
cation Q, in which at least two individuals can profitably exchange the probability
shares of some objects. Therefore, if an allocation contains an improvement cycle,
there exist some individuals who can be better off. After the exchange occurs in the
improvement cycle, the new allocation, say Q′, is said to stochastically dominates
the allocation Q.
Definition: An allocation is said to be ordinally efficient if there exists no im-
provement cycle. In other words, it is not stochastically dominated by another
allocation.
Proposition 3.3 (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)).
An allocation Q is ordinally efficient if and only if it exhibits no improvement cycle.
Proposition 3.4. Any rank respecting allocation Q for A is ordinally efficient.
Note that every stable allocation ofM associated with A is ordinally efficient, also
rank respecting by Proposition 3.4.
Now, we refer to another efficiency definition. Let us denote the set of most preferred
k objects by individual i ∈ I as ri(k). Given any allocation Q for A, define wQ =
(wQ1 , . . . ,wQn ) as the aggregate efficiency vector of the allocation Q where w
Q
k =∑
i∈I
∑
j∈ri(k) qij . w
Q is a vector in which the coordinates of the vector show the
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sum of probabilities for each individual to be assigned his first best, first two bests,
first three best and so on.
Definition: An allocation Q is said to aggregate stochastically dominate an
allocation Q′ in A, if wQ ≥ wQ′ .
In an object allocation problem A, R1 mechanism, proposed by Alioğulları, Barlo,
and Tuncay (2013), can be considered as the specification of the well-known PS rule.
Different than the PS rule, assume that each individual has the right to reserve his
first best object so that no individual, who does not rank it best, can receive a
positive probability share. Alioğulları, Barlo, and Tuncay (2013) proved that the
resulting allocation of the R1 mechanism aggregate stochastically dominates the PS
allocation.
Proposition 3.5. The stable allocation of a matching market M = ((Ci),(Cj))
associated with A where Cj are equal award, aggregate stochastically dominates the
resulting allocation of R1 mechanism.
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4. THE DYNAMIC PROCESS THAT YIELDS PS ALLOCATION
In an object allocation market A, PS allocation is generated by the well-known
uniform speed simultaneous eating algorithm introduced by Bogomolnaia - Moulin
(2001). We mentioned that PS rule is the unique procedure resulting in a unique
random assignment that satisfies ordinal efficiency, envy freeness, and bounded in-
variance properties 1.
In the literature, recently, Harless (2019) shows that PS allocation can be obtained
by a different algorithm, which is called ordered-claims-algorithm. Here, we study
if PS allocation can be obtained by a different and more "decentralized" process
than eating algorithm and ordered-claims-algorithm. The driving force behind this
study is to investigate which underlying assumptions is required to construct such
a process.
Consider an object allocation problem A= (Pi) over (I,J), where Q is an allocation
matrix described as in Chapter 3.1.
Let di be the individual i’s demand vector and dij denote the amount of i’s demand
on j. Similarly, let rj be the object j’s rejection vector and rij denote the amount of
j’s rejection for i. DefineD= {d∈RJ+ | 0≤ dij ≤ 1} andR= {r ∈RI+ | 0≤ rij ≤ 1}
as the two sets, namely the sets of demand and rejection vectors. A demand function
is a map D :R→D and a rejection function is a map R :D→R. For each j ∈ J
and each preference ordering Pi, define U(j,Pi) = {j′ ∈ J | j′ Pi j} as the upper
counter set of j in Pi. Additionally, let j∗i (j) ∈ U(j,Pi) be the least favoured object
by i among the upper counter set of j.
The demand function for an individual i is described by;
Di(r) = di where dij =
 1 U(j,Pi) = ∅rij∗i (j) otherwise
for all j. In other words, each i demands full probability from her best favourite
object and transfer the rejection to the next best object as her demand. An indi-
1See Bogomolnaia - Heo (2012) for more detail.
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vidual’s demand corresponds to her preference ordering with one restriction: Any
rejection from an object cannot be offered as a demand to an object which is ranked
higher than the first object. We call this behaviour no-going-back condition.
Rejection function for an object j is described by;
Rj(d) = rj where rij = min{λj ,dij} and λj ∈ R+ is chosen so that ∑i′∈I ri′j =
max{0,∑i∈I dij−1}.
In other words, each j has a equal loss choice function described in Chapter 3.2
2. However, since demand functions are described by rejections, we choose to use
rejection functions for every j.
Define the sequences (Dt), (Rt) and (Qt) by the following recursive process; 3
R0 = 0
Dt =DI(Rt)
Rt =RJ(Dt)
Qt =Dt−Rt
Basically, we call Rt as a rejection matrix and individuals choose their demand
according to Rt. Dt is called demand matrix of individuals, and objects issue the
rejection vector according to Dt. Q is the allocation matrix, which is difference
between demands and rejections. The process ends where there is no change in Rt.
Remark: di and rj are monotonically increasing vectors for every i and j.
The matrices can be updated simultaneously by all individuals or some set of indi-
viduals. At the one extreme, it can be updated only one individual. In between,
any subset of individuals can update the demand vectors for any subset of objects
at any step of the recursive process.
Lemma 4.1. The Dynamic Process is sequence independent.
As we mentioned before, Harless (2019) introduced a new algorithm that yields PS
allocation, namely the ordered-claims-algorithm. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
Suppose there is a "coordinator" in an object allocation problem, who follows a
selection rule at each round and a distribution rule for each object at each round. To
obtain the PS allocation, Harless introduces a particular selection and distribution
rule. If the coordinator selects the objects that have the maximum average excess
2Different than the Chapter 3, the choice functions does not respond to any preference orderings.
3Note that Di(0) = uj¯i for every i where j¯i is the first best object for every i and uj¯i is the j¯
th
i unit vector.
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demand and distribute them according to the equal loss rule, the algorithm results in
the PS allocation. Our main result here is the following proposition and we will prove
it by showing the equivalence between the ordered-claims-algorithm with particular
selection and distribution rule and the Dynamic Process with simultaneous sequence.
Proposition 4.1. the Dynamic Process generates the PS allocation.
As in ordered-claims-algorithm, PS rule also requires a coordinator who informs
individuals when an object is exhausted. However, under two assumptions, the Dy-
namic Process is more decentralized and sequence independent. These assumptions
are characteristics of demand and rejection functions. Objects choice functions are
equal loss, which is the distribution rule that Harless uses to have PS allocation. Our
main investigation here is the no-going-back condition, which is the key assumption
to have more decentralized process than PS rule and ordered-claims-algorithm.
Even though the Dynamic Process generates the PS allocation and the PS algorithm
is weak strategyproof, the recursive structure of the Dynamic Process creates a new
incentive problem. Weak strategyproofness guarentees that individuals cannot be
better off by misreporting their preference orderings. However, no-going-back condi-
tion is a strong assumption on individuals’ behaviours. If we relax this assumption,
individuals can be better off by misreporting their demand vectors. More specif-
ically, an individual has an incentive to transfer the rejection by an object to the
more preferred ones. Since objects have equal loss choice functions, higher amount
of demand will generate higher amount of acceptance.
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5. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose Q is the stable allocation but not rank re-
specting. Then, if j is not bottom of Qi, there exists at least one individual i′ with
qi′j > 0 and ri
′
j > r
i
j . Since j is not bottom of Qi, i likes j. However, since the market
is aligned, qi′j > 0 and ri
′
j > r
i
j imply that j also likes i. Hence, it contradicts with
Q being stable.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. If part: Suppose rij = ri
′
j and j is not bottom for i.
Since Q exhibits no-discrimination, we know that qij ≥ qi′j and also since market is
aligned we know that j is indifferent between i and i′. Since j is not bottom for i,
there exists a j′ where qij′ > 0 and jPij′.
Suppose Cj are not equal award. Then, in the Gale - Shapley algorithm i must
be partially rejected by j. If i′ is bottom for j, then Cj does not contradict with
equal award. Suppose i′ is not bottom for j and qij = qi′j , then again Cj does not
contradict with equal award. Now, suppose qij > qi′j . Then, it contradicts with Q
exhibiting no-discrimination.
Only if part: Suppose Cj are equal award and the stable allocation forM exhibits
discrimination against i. Then, if j is not bottom for i and rij = ri
′
j , we have qij < qi′j .
Since j is not bottom for i, i likes j. Also, since market is aligned, rij = ri
′
j implies j
is indifferent between i and i′. Therefore, qij < qi′j implies that j does not equally
award i and i′. Hence, it contradicts with Cj being equal award.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Take an allocation Q that is rank respecting and sup-
pose it is not ordinally efficient. Therefore, there must be an improvement cycle
where individuals can profitably exchange some probability shares. Since the allo-
cation respects rank, for at least one pair in the improvement cycle in−1, in ∈ I and
jn, jn+1 ∈ J , we have that in strictly prefers jn to jn+1, qinjn+1 > 0 and qin−1jn > 0
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and this implies that object jn is ranked at the same level in Pin−1 and Pin , or at the
higher level in Pin−1 . Therefore, individual in desires more probability shares of jn,
which can be taken from any i′ with qi′jn > 0. Therefore, i′ must be in the improve-
ment cycle, without loss of generality let us call him as individual in−1. Then, he
desires more probability of jn−1 where jn−1Pin−1jn, which can be exchanged with
an in−2 with qin−2jn−1 > 0. Similarly, in−2 is also in the improvement cycle. Since
the cycle end with the initial pair of individuals, there exists some im who desires
more probability of object jn+1 from in. There must be the case that qinjn+1 > 0,
hence in must rank this object as higher as the im. However, by continuing in this
regard, it must be the case that jn+1 must be ranked higher in Pim than Pin . This
contradiction concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Suppose Q is the stable allocation of an aligned
matching market M associated with A and Q′ is the resulting allocation of R1
mechanism. We can easily say that wQ1 = w
Q′
1 . Notice that since Q is rank respect-
ing, there exists no individual who receives positive probability from j even though
individuals who rank j higher than the first individual are not completely satisfied.
However in the R1 mechanism, the opposite can occur. Therefore, we can guarantee
that wQk ≥ wQ
′
k . By the example given in Chapter 3.2, we can conclude the proof.
In the example, Q and Q′ are the following matrices, respectively

1/3 0 0 1/9 5/9
0 1/2 0 1/9 7/18
0 1/2 1/3 1/9 1/18
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0


1/3 0 4/15 1/5 1/5
0 1/2 1/10 1/5 1/5
0 1/2 1/10 1/5 1/5
1/3 0 4/15 1/5 1/5
1/3 0 4/15 1/5 1/5

Hence, wQ = {2,3, 113 ,4,5} and wQ
′ = {2, 7930 , 175 ,4,5}. Since wQ > wQ
′ , Q aggregate
stochastically dominates Q′.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Suppose there exist two sequences, S and S′, in which
at least one individual has a different allocation, meaning that she has a different
demand for at least one object. Let dSij 6= dS
′
ij for a pair (i, j) at the end of the
each sequence. j cannot be the first best object since the demand for the first best
objects is always 1 in every sequence. Therefore, rSij∗i (j) 6= r
S′
ij∗i (j)
, which implies the
rejection vector of j∗i (j) is different at the end of each sequence. Hence, there exists
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at least one individual whose demand for j∗i (j) is different in each sequence. Let
dSi′j∗i (j)
6= dS′i′j∗i (j). By continuing this process, we can conclude that the rejection
from the first ranked object for an individual differs at the end of each sequence, let
denote the object as j¯i. Since the demand for the first best objects does not differ,
there exists an individual whose demand is different for j¯i at S and S′. Following
the same fashion, we can conclude that the rejection from the first ranked object for
an individual differs at S and S′.
Since the set of individuals is finite, every object that is first ranked gives different
rejection at the end of S and S′. Therefore, they have different demand vectors at
each sequence. Since each individual’s demand for her first best object is 1, we can
say that each first ranked object accepts at least one demand from an individual
who does not rank it best.
Let j∗ be the first ranked such that the number of individuals who rank it best is
more than any other first ranked objects. There exists a time in S and S′ such that
j∗ receives all of the demands from each individual who ranks it best. Let denote
this time as t∗ We claim that, at t∗, j∗ would reject all the demand that receives
from an individual who does not rank it best and rejects all the new demands after
t∗. Since the sequences are different, we have tS∗ 6= tS
′
∗ . Suppose the number of
individuals who rank j∗ best is m.
Remark: Since rejection for an individual cannot be higher than her demand, an
individual’s demand is decreasing as the rank of objects is increasing.
Let i be the individual who is accepted by j∗ and not ranks j∗ best. Note that
i’s maximum demand for an object that is not best ranked by i must be less than
1− 1m . Also, λj∗ would be 1− 1m , if j∗ receives demands only from the individuals
who rank j∗ best. Therefore, after t∗, j∗ will reject every individual who does not
first rank j∗. Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We will prove the proposition by showing the equiv-
alence between the Dynamic Process with the sequence where the agents move
simultaneously and structured ordered claim algorithm with average loss selection
order and constrained equal loss distribution rule, fal,CEL introduced by Harless
(2019). By Lemma 6.1, the result can generalize for every sequence.
First we prove that the Dynamic Process will converge. In other words, there will be
a set of object which will be permanently distribute itself at every t. Let us define
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M t = {j ∈ J | j = argmax
j′∈I\⋃t−1
t′=1M
t−1
λtj′}
be the set of objects which issued the maximum amount of equal rejection for the
first time at step t. Notice that M t is a non-empty set. For this process, following
lemma will guarantee that the process will converge.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose j ∈M t. Then, λtj = λt+1j = · · ·= λTj
Proof. Begin with λtj is the maximum amount among the all objects, any demanded
probability share in the t+ 1 must be less than or equal to λtj . That is, dt+1ij′ < λtj
for all j′ ∈ J . Additionally, to have λtj 6= λt+1j , it must be the case that there exists
at least one object j such that dt+1ij > λt+1j . Then, we have λt+1j < dt+1ij < λtj , which
contradicts with λj being an increasing vector.
Now, we will show that the set of selected objects at step t in fal,CEL, is the same
with the objects in M t.
Let us denote the i’s claim for object j in fal,CEL as cij . In fal,CEL, firstly algorithm
selects a set of objects, then distribute the selected objects. The others do not take
any action. However in the Dynamic Process, each object and each agent is active.
Remember that starting demand vector is the one where each agent demand 1
from the most favoured objects. Similarly, starting claim vector is the one where
each object receives 1 from the related individuals in fal,CEL. However, differently,
distribution is limited to set of some objects in fal,CEL. In the second step, some
agents take action in fal,CEL, who might have already made his action in the first
step of Dynamic Process. Regarding this fashion, we know that the demand vector
carries all claims from the claim vector, even more.
Now, let us separate the demand vector in two part: demands which are already
in fal,CEL as a claim and the others. We will use the same notation, c, in fal,CEL
for the first component and we will denote the demands different than the claims in
fal,CEL as k.
Let us denote the rejection occurs in fal,CEL at step t as f t, which is the average
excess claim for an object and the object has the maximum amount of f t is selected
to distribute. In fal,CEL, if an object is selected, they leave the market and become
unavailable for the next steps. Let us call the others as available objects.
Claim: Suppose j is a selected object in fal,CEL at step t, then ctj = dtj .
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In other words, the claim vector for the selected objects in fal,CEL is same with the
demand vector of the same objects in Dynamic Process.
Proof. Suppose not. Let object j is selected at step t in fal,CEL. Then, we know
that for all j′ in the set of available objects at step t;
f tj′ < f
t
j
Suppose in the Dynamic Process, object j at step t receives the demand vector
which contains all claims in fal,CEL but additionally has at least one demand, ktij .
Since all ktij must be feasible, meaning that greater than the λtj , we have;
f tj′ < f
t
j ≤ λtj ≤ kij = λt−1j′
where we use the fact that each demand is some amount of rejection coming from
an object at previous step. Observe that each ktij added to f tj will increase this
ratio and notice that object j′ must have not been selected in fal,CEL, otherwise it
would be included in claim vector, cj or j′ is not in the set of available objects. Now
consider following cases:
Case I In the Dynamic Process, the demand vector of object j′ received at t−1 is
the same with the claim vector in fal,CEL, i.e. dt−1j′ = c
t−1
j′ . Then, immediately we
can conclude that λt−1j′ < f tj′ < f tj . However, previously we concluded that
f tj ≤ λtj
Therefore, following equations gives us contradiction.
f tj ≤ λtj ≤ kij = λt−1j′ < f tj′ < f tj
Case II : Suppose dt−1j′ 6= ct−1j′ . Therefore, there exists new demands, kt−1ij′ , which
must be greater than λt−1j′ , that is, λ
t−1
j′ < k
t−1
ij′ . We know that k
t−1
ij′ is some amount
of rejection from a different object at step t− 2, which is not a selected object in
fal,CEL. Otherwise it would be contained in ct−1ij′ . Therefore we can conclude that
λt−1j′ < k
t−1
ij′ = λ
t−2
j′′ . Here, again we have two cases. If the demand vector of object
j′′ receives at t-2 is the same with the claim vector in fal,CEL, we are at the same
position as in Case I. Therefore suppose they are not the same. Then, with the same
logic we can conclude that
lt−1j′ < k
t−1
ij′ = λ
t−2
j′′ < k
t−1
ij′′ = λ
t−2
j′′′ < · · ·< k2ij∗ = λ1j∗∗
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where in the very first step, j∗∗ is not selected in fal,CEL. Moreover, we know that
a claim vector and a demand vector is the same in the first step. Therefore, λ1j∗∗
is equal to the loss occurred in fal,CEL, which is less than or equal to the losses
occurred at the next steps. Therefore, we can conclude that
f tj ≤ λtj ≤ kij = λt−1j′ < kt−1ij′ = λt−2j′′ < kt−2ij′′ = λt−3j′′′ < · · ·< k2ij∗ = λ1j∗∗ = f1j∗∗ ≤ f2j∗∗ ≤
. . .f tj∗∗ < f
t
j
where we use the fact that none of the objects are selected in fal,CEL so that
we can say that the average excess demand is increasing as we increase the steps.
Contradiction.
Claim: The set of selected objects at step t in fal,CEL, is the same with the objects
in M t.
Proof. Suppose not. By the previous claim, we know that selected objects in fal,CEL
has the same demand vector with Dynamic Process. Suppose an object j is selected
in fal,CEL but not in M t. Then there exists a j′ such that λtj < λtj′ where j′ ∈M t.
Since the claim vectors resulting f tj is the same with λtj we have;
f tj′ < f
t
j = λtj < λtj′ = f tj′
Conradiction.
We conclude that permanently exhausted objects at step t are the same objects in
fal,CEL and the Dynamic Process; also they have the same claim and demand vec-
tors. Then, each object leaves the market with the same claim vector and rejection
amount. Therefore, their resulting allocation is the same.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Any given allocation problem, we can derive a matching market by endogenously
attributing priority orderings for objects and by assuming that they are endowed
with a choice function. The attribution bases on the given preference profile of
the individuals and the choice functions correspond to these preference orderings.
We know that any strict responsive choice function is substitutable. Moreover,
the preference for being preferred property for objects makes the Gale - Shapley
algorithm greedy. Therefore, substitutability of choice functions corresponding to
weak preference ordering is not necessary condition to have the existence of stable
matchings. Hence, we can examine the desirable properties such as respect for rank,
no-discrimination, ordinal and aggregate efficiency by relating them to the stability
concept.
We show that any rank respecting allocation for an object allocation problem is
the stable allocation for a matching market associated with an object allocation
problem. The converse is also true, however deriving a matching market from an
object allocation problem is much intuitive. Also, if we let the choice functions
be equal award, we observe that the stable allocation exhibits no-discrimination
and aggregate stochastically dominates the resulting allocation of R1 mechanism.
Regarding ordinal efficiency, we show that in an object allocation problem, any rank
respecting allocation is ordinally efficient.
When we derive a matching market, we remark that there exist infinitely many
aligned matching markets associated with an object allocation problem. A specific
choice functions in that family might result in different properties, such as aggregate
efficiency and no cumulative discrimination.
The Dynamic Process can be thought of as an uncoordinated process that yields PS
allocation. However, it obeys some rules in terms of individuals’ and objects’ be-
haviors. The process endogenously determines which object would be permanently
distributed. However, this creates a new door for an incentive to manipulate. PS
allocation is weakly strategy-proof, meaning that the individuals cannot achieve bet-
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ter allocation by misreporting their preference ordering. Even though the Dynamic
Process yields PS allocation, it creates a spot for individuals to deviate. When
they choosing from a rejection vector, if their choice function is not fixed, they can
achieve better allocation by misreporting their demand vectors.
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